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ABSTRACT
A method called DMP for Detection of the Minimal Path set of any
fault-tolerant technical system, the system being represented as a
multi-domain object-oriented model, is described, exemplified and
substantiated in this article. Thus, by use of DMP, a safety analysis of
the system is automatically performed. DMP employs simulation of
normal behaviour, degradation and failure of a system. In essence, it is
a state space simulation. The state space, in this context, denotes the
set of combinations of intact and failed components of a system to be
examined for detection of its minimal path set. Without any reduction
technique, the size of a system’s state space grows exponentially with
the number of its components. In order to render the DMP method
feasible, the object structure of the system model is represented as a
graph. Evaluation of the graph reduces the size of the state space and
hence the number of simulations required.
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1. Introduction
Safety and reliability are essential in commercial air transport, as well as other technical areas.
Safety assessment is therefore an inherent part of the aircraft and on-board systems development
process. In this complex systems development process, multi-domain object-oriented modelling
languages such as Modelica [1] have nowadays become the state-of-the-art.
This article contributes to the field of model-based, automated safety and reliability analysis. It
describes a method called DMP that integrates these analyses with multi-domain object-oriented
modelling. DMP is in essence an automated detection of a fault-tolerant technical system’s
minimal path set, based on a corresponding model of the system. State space simulation, that
is, simulation of normal behaviour, degradation and failure of the system is employed that is
composed of a number of components. To this end, modelling of failures is supplemented to
component models from generic libraries, for example, the Modelica Standard Library [2], since
these typically represent only normal, intact behaviour. After a system’s minimal path set is
detected, probability of system failure (or operation) is calculated using component failure rates.
Figure 1 illustrates the concept of state space simulation by the example of an aircraft’s rudder
control and actuation system. The image is actually the top level view of a corresponding Modelica
model that is described in section 6.3 of [3]. Using a rudder position demand signal φdmd, the
system model is simulated for combinations of intact and failed components. (The image shows just
one of a multitude of combinations.) Whether the system operates or fails is identified by
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comparison of the simulated rudder position φ to the demand φdmd (see Section 2.2). Section 3
explains in detail how method DMP uses graph algorithms to counter the problem of exponential
growth of a system’s state space.
Other approaches to automated safety or reliability analysis based on multi-domain object-
oriented modelling exist. One of them has been described by Bunus and Lunde [4] in 2008 that is
dedicated particularly to model-based diagnosis, that is, detection and isolation of failures in a
technical system. For these purposes, the approach uses algebraic equations and constraints
(inequalities) but no differential equations. Hence, it enables simulation of steady-state but rules
out simulation of transient effects. Another approach has been described by Papadopoulos et al.
[5] in 2001 that conducts semi-automatic synthesis of fault-trees by evaluation of failure annota-
tions included in the components of a system model.
The DMP method described in this article differs from the existing approaches, in so far that
differential-algebraic equations (DAE) are used for modelling and simulation (not just annotat-
ing) of failures. This enables the conducting of all other studies that initially motivated the
implementing of a model of a fault-tolerant system.
For instance, with regard to aircraft electric networks, simulation of normal, abnormal or
degraded operation permits the conducting of an electric loads analysis that reveals the most
demanding cases for the components (e.g. generators, contactors, wires) of the network. These
cases dictate the dimensioning of components and, in turn, their weight. Hence, such an
electric network model can be used also for consideration of the network components
capabilities and a balancing of all power needs, thus minimizing the dimensioning of compo-
nents and, eventually, overall system weight. Corresponding work is documented in [6]
and [7].
In addition, the DMP method encourages that safety or reliability analyses be conducted
frequently during the system development process, which keeps them up-to-date especially
when a system’s design is changed. The aim is improvement of system development and
safety assessment processes, according to the concept of model-based systems engineering
(MBSE).
Figure 1. State space simulation of an aircraft’s rudder control and actuation system.
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2. Modelling approach
This section refers to the approach selected for the modelling of fault-tolerant systems and the
necessary additions.
2.1. Modelling of failures
Minimal path set detection by method DMP requires that failure of a system can be simulated in
addition to its normal behaviour. Thus, the modelling has to be supplemented by equations that
reflect failures of system components and, if applicable, by operating logics that determine how a
system reacts to the occurrence of component failures.
Model parameter values are changed in order to represent a failure. In doing so, the model
equations remain the same (structure-invariant approach). For example, an open circuit (O/C)
failure of an electrical conductor is described by changing its resistance R from the nominal to a
much larger value.
Figure 9 in Section 3.2.2 shows an electric heating circuit that is used for exemplification of the
DMP method. Figure 2 shows a voltage source, voltage divider resistor and ground that are
comprised in the circuit. A minimal path set analysis considers open circuit failures of these
components that are modelled as follows.
The voltage source shown in Figure 2(a) is modelled as a series connection of an ideal voltage
source V0 with an internal resistance R. The voltage at the pins is V ¼ ðV0  RÞi, with R ¼
Rnom ¼ 1mΩ if the source is intact and R ¼ RO=C ¼ 1 kΩ (example values) if it has failed. The
same concept of shifting the resistance R value to distinguish between the intact state and open
circuit failure is used for the voltage divider resistor (Figure 2(b)) and ground element (c)
models.
Large, realistic examples of aircraft on-board system models including further compo-
nent failures, for example, mechanical disconnection or loss of hydraulic pressure, are
provided in [3,8–10]. In conducting a state space simulation, method DMP activates
component failures by directly accessing the relevant model parameters. Alternatively, a
universal fault triggering network described by van der Linden [11] can be used for
activation of failures.
Provided that the preconditions (see Section 3.1.2) are met, DMP can be used also if the
structure of the model equations is changed to represent failures. Such a structure-variant, multi-
mode approach is described by Elmqvist et al. [12].
A failure rate parameter λi is stored in each component model that includes failure. Since the λi
values are used only for post-processing (see Equations (2) and (3)), they can be inserted also as
custom annotations; a concept described by Zimmer et al. [13].
Figure 2. An electric voltage source (a), a voltage divider resistor (b) and a ground (c).
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2.2. Indication of system status
Safety or reliability assessment requires the analyst to define criteria that decide if a system
operates normally or if it fails. Such criteria have to be implemented in a system model, in
order to compute a sysOp output signal that indicates the system status (operation or failure). In
case of the flight control and actuation system shown in Figure 1, sysOp can be determined by
comparing the actual (simulated) position φ of the controlled surface with the demand φdmd
(model input).
Suppose that the system model is simulated for the position demand φdmd as shown in
Figure 3. The capability of the system to move the surface accordingly depends on the status
(intact or failed) of its components. A tolerance band is defined that is bounded by φdmd  tol
φmax, where tol is the tolerance, for example, 0.05, and φmax is the maximum surface deflection
angle, for example, 25°. If the simulated deflection angle stays within the tolerance band, as is the
case for φ1 in this example, then ‘system operates’ = sysOp is indicated. If the system cannot
move the surface according to the demand, as occurs for φ2 and φ3, then ‘system failure’ = not
sysOp is indicated.
The capability of the system to follow demands is examined by the minimal path set detection
method DMP for multiple combinations of intact and failed components. In so doing, sysOp is
evaluated for correlation with the respective component states.
3. A method for minimal path set detection
In this section, the DMP method is described that solves the problem of determining the failure
probability of a system by detecting its minimal path set. DMP draws on a representation of the
system model object structure as a graph and on simulation. Minimal path set analysis generally
assumes that a system and its components are two-state, intact or failed, as explained in section
2.3 of [14].
The DMP method is a state space simulation. In this context, the state space denotes the set of
all combinations of intact and failed components of a system. As is obvious, the size of the state
space grows exponentially with the number of components of a system. In order to prevent
unfeasibility of the DMP method due to this growth phenomenon also known as ‘combinatorial
explosion’, algorithms founded on graph theory are devised for evaluation of the graph that
corresponds to an object-oriented system model. Most combinations of intact and failed compo-
nents, that is, a large part of a system’s state space, can be neglected as a result of evaluating the
graph. Then, the system model is simulated only for the remaining part of the state space, which
considerably reduces the computing effort.
Figure 3. Simulation of a flight control surface deflection angle φ. System operates = sysOp for φ1. System failure = not
sysOp for φ2, φ3.
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3.1. Definitions and preparations
3.1.1. Definitions
Definitions are provided of the terms used in the following for the DMP method:
Set. A defined collection of distinct objects, for example, the components of a system.
Subset. A is a subset of B, A  B, if every object of A is also an object of B, for example,
1; 2; 3f g  1; 2; 3f g. If A is a subset of but unequal to B, then A is a proper subset of B,
A  B, for example, 1; 2f g  1; 2; 3f g.
Superset. A is a superset of B, A  B, if every object of B is also an object of A, for example,
1; 2; 3f g  1; 2; 3f g. If A is a superset of but unequal to B, then A is a proper superset of B,
A  B, for example, 1; 2; 3f g  1; 2f g.
Difference set. AnB denotes the set of elements that are members of A but not of B, for example,
1; 2; 3f gn 2f g ¼ 1; 3f g, or 1; 2; 3f gn 4f g ¼ 1; 2; 3f g.
Component. A distinct element of a system. In this article, components are also called nodes.
Combination. A set of intact components of a system.
Path. A set of intact components that causes a system to operate.
S–T path. A source-to-target path in a graph.
Path set. A set of paths of a system.
Minimal path. A path that cannot be reduced without causing system failure.
Minimal path set. The set of all minimal paths of a system.
Graph. A representation of a set of objects, for example, the components (nodes) of a system,
and of the connections between them.
Node. An object in a graph. Nodes are also called components in this article.
Edge. A link that connects a pair of nodes in a graph.
Articulation. A node in a graph (or path) that, if removed, causes disconnection of the graph
(or path) into several subgraphs.
Subgraph. A part of a graph whose set of nodes and set of edges are subsets of those of the
graph, the set of edges being restricted to the subset of nodes.
Density. The density d of a graph is generally, for example, in [15], defined by
d N;Eð Þ ¼ 2E=N N  1ð Þ; (1)
where N and E denote the numbers of nodes and edges of the graph, respectively.
Probability computation. The probability of system operation or failure is computed from the
system’s minimal path set in applying the reliabilities of its components. Let Ci denote the intact
state of component i. Then, the probability of occurrence P of a minimal path MP is, see [16],
P MPð Þ ¼ P C1 ^ C2 ^ . . .ð Þ "Ci 2 MP
P MPð Þ ¼
Y
Ci2MP
P Cið Þ ¼
Y
Ci2MP
Ri tð Þ; Ri tð Þ ¼ eλit ; (2)
with the component reliabilities Ri, failure rates λi and exposure time t. Exponentially distributed
lifetimes are assumed. Other lifetime models, for example, Weibull distribution, can be used as
well. The probability of system operation RsysðtÞ is computed from the probabilities of the
minimal paths by
RsysðtÞ ¼ P MP1 _ . . . _MPrð Þ
¼P
r
j¼1
P MPj
 P
r1
j¼1
Pr
k¼jþ1
P MPj ^MPk
 þ . . .
þ 1ð Þrþ1P MP1 ^MP2 ^ . . . ^MPrð Þ;
(3)
MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTER MODELLING OF DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS 345
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
LR
-B
ibl
iot
he
ke
n]
 at
 08
:50
 29
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
where r is the number of all minimal paths in the set. Equation (3) is called Poincaré formula. It is
evaluated for illustration at the end of Section 3.2.2.
3.1.2. Properties of minimal paths and requirements for detection
This subsection explains the assumptions and requirements that apply to method DMP:
(1) The system behaves monotonously. This refers to a system that operates if all its compo-
nents are intact and fails if all components fail. If the system operates while not all
components are intact, it continues operating if any further component becomes intact.
Conversely, if the system has failed, it remains failed if any further component fails. This
definition of monotony is common in safety analysis. For instance, it can be found in
section 14.2 of [16].
(2) Every real world component is represented by one model object and by one node in a
corresponding graph. No component is represented by two or more model objects or
nodes.
DMP relies on a representation of the object structure of a system model as a graph. Nodes of the
graph represent components, and edges the connections between components. The establishing of
a graph is described in Section 3.1.3. The properties of minimal paths, and in particular their
situation in the graph, are explained in the following, which then proceeds to further requirements
for method DMP.
Depending on the systemmodel and, if applicable, the marking of sources (S) and targets (T) in the
corresponding graph, some S–T paths are minimal paths. This is true, for instance, for the electric
network models shown in [8,9], where also related detection methods are described. In general,
however, what is known is only that a minimal path consists of one or more connected nodes.
This is explained by Figure 4 that depicts a part of a flight control surface actuation system model
and its accompanying graph. The edges of the graph correspond to the interfaces that exchange
power, material or signals among the components (nodes) of a system. This exchange among
neighboured nodes enables a system to operate. No other nodes are situated between any of those
nodes that exchange power, material or signals and hence belong to a minimal path. Thus, only a
coherent set of nodes can be a minimal path. The following defines a coherent set of nodes:
Definition 1. A set of nodes in a graph is coherent if any two nodes of the set are connected
through a series of edges and through only those nodes that belong to the set.
Figure 5 shows coherent and incoherent sets of nodes (marked blue) for illustration. An S–T
path, such as (c), is hence a special case of a coherent set of nodes.
Figure 4. Exchange of power and signals across the edges in a coherent set of nodes.
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Coherence (interconnection) of intact nodes in the system graph is a precondition for a
minimal path. Removing a node from a minimal path interrupts the exchange of power, material
or signals among the nodes of the minimal path. If no other minimal paths exist, the system fails.
If the system operates with an incoherent set of intact nodes, some nodes can be removed from
the set, that is, fail, without interrupting the exchange of power etc. Such a set of nodes is
therefore a path but not a minimal path. Thus, the third assumption for method DMP is:
(3) Only a coherent set of intact nodes in a system graph can be a minimal path.
Because not every coherent set of intact nodes is a minimal path, the system model is simulated
to determine which ones are actually minimal paths.
3.1.3. Graph representation of multi-domain object-oriented models
A graph is defined by its adjacency list (array AL). In AL, each row corresponds to a node of the
graph. The neighbours of a node are stored in the respective row of AL, as will be illustrated. If
more than one connection exists between two components of a model, this is reflected by a single
edge in the graph. (That is, in each row of AL, any node is stored not more than once.) It is only
relevant that any two nodes of the graph are connected, but it is not important whether the two
nodes are connected by one or more than one edge. Additionally, the interface types are not
evaluated by method DMP, so they are not reflected in the graph.
For illustration, the adjacency list is indicated for a part of the systemmodel depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 6(a) shows the component (node) and interface names, and the indices in (b). The number-
ing of nodes – encircled in (b) – corresponds to Figure 4. The connections via mechanical flanges,
hydraulic ports, electric pins etc. are declared in the model by the connect () statements below.
Figure 5. Coherent (a), (b), (c) and incoherent sets of nodes (d), (e) in a graph.
Figure 6. Components and connections in a multi-domain object-oriented model.
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They are expressed in terms of the component and interface names (left column), and in terms of
component and interface indices (right column).
(1) connect(POB1.flange_a, Motor1.flange); (1.1, 2.3)
(2) connect(Motor1.port_a, Valve1.port_A); (2.1, 3.1)
(3) connect(Motor1.port_b, Valve1.port_B); (2.2, 3.2)
(4) connect(POB1.p, Computer1.p_B); (1.2, 4.5)
(5) connect(Valve1.p, Computer1.p_V); (3.3, 4.4)
(6) connect(Computer1.Sw1, Up1.p); (4.2, 5.1)
(7) connect(Up1.p, Down1.p); (5.1, 6.1)
(8) connect(Computer1.Up1, Up1.n); (4.1, 5.2)
(9) connect(Computer1.Down1, Down1.n); (4.3, 6.2)
The algorithm that actually prepares an adjacency list AL is described in detail in subsection 3.1.3
of [3]. First, it stores the list of connect () statements in a stack named Sconn (index format).
Then, it starts an i-loop over all nodes. For each node, the algorithm parses the rows of Sconn, that
is, the connect () statements, to check if this node (node i) occurs in it. If yes, the algorithm
checks if AL already indicates that node i and the other node of the corresponding connect ()
statement are connected. If not, then these nodes are stored in the respective two rows of AL. The
connect () statement is deleted from stack Sconn, since it does not need to be evaluated again
in subsequent loop iterations.
A special case occurs if more than one node is directly or indirectly connected to one and the
same interface of a node, as happens for the sixth and seventh connections of the example:
Computer1.Sw1 (4.2) is connected to Up1.p (5.1), and in turn Up1.p (5.1) is con-
nected to Down1.p (6.1). Actually, there is a direct connection between (4.2) and (6.1). It
only appears to be indirect, across (5.1), because each connect () statement links exactly two
nodes. To reflect that a direct connection exists between (4.2) and (6.1), the algorithm
introduces an auxiliary node (14). Auxiliary nodes do not represent any real or model object;
rather, they are introduced to ensure that coherent sets of nodes are correctly detected by method
DMP. An auxiliary node is stored as an additional row in the adjacency list AL.
Figure 7 specifies the adjacency list for Figure 6(b) in terms of the node indices and shows the
corresponding graph.
3.2. Detection of minimal paths
Method DMP is capable of detecting the minimal path set if conditions (1), (2) and (3) defined in
Section 3.1.2 are fulfilled. The detection starts with all system components (nodes) intact. Nodes
are then successively removed from the system graph, which corresponds to component failures.
The model is simulated to identify if the system still operates or fails.
Figure 7. Adjacency list AL and graph for Figure 6(b) .
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Articulations can occur in the graph that, if removed, cause disconnection of the graph into several
subgraphs. Since only a coherent set of intact nodes can be a minimal path, splitting up the graph at
articulations reduces the state space and thus the number of simulations. The lower the density of a
system graph is, the more articulations occur within it and thus fewer simulations are required. For
completeness, method DMP allows that articulations can also belong to a minimal path.
3.2.1. Detection algorithm
Figure 8 shows a flow chart of the detection algorithm. It consists of a preparation phase (steps
DMP.1–4) and the actual, iterative detection process (steps DMP.5–17). Steps DMP.3, 8 and
11–16 refer to lower level algorithms that are described in detail, including code, in [3]. The
meaning of the symbols used is as follows:
nr number of all components that can fail of a system
nLoop iteration counter of detection process
rn node(s) to be removed from a path of array PSprev
PS, PSprev arrays of path sets in the actual and previous iteration, respec-
tively, of the detection process
isMinPS, isMinPSprev Boolean arrays that store if a path in array PS or PSprev is minimal
np, npprev number of paths stored in PS and PSprev, respectively
SF array for storing combinations that cause system failure
nsf number of combinations stored in array SF
In the preparation phase, the necessary data are retrieved from the system model (step DMP.1).
Then, the model is simulated to check if the system operates for the set of initially intact
components (nodes). To this end, the model output sysOp is evaluated. A monotonous system
will operate, and the procedure is continued only in this case (step DMP.2). If the system fails, no
minimal path can be detected, and the process is aborted. Next, a graph (adjacency list) of the
system model is established (step DMP.3, see Section 3.1.3). Then, several arrays are initialized
(step DMP.4) for the detection process.
At the start of an iteration, the paths detected so far, their number, as well as the
information whether they are minimal are assigned to PSprev, npprev and isMinPSprev.
Arrays PS, isMinPS and the counter np are reset (step DMP.5). Then, nLoop is increased by
one. Next, combinations are generated from the paths in PSprev. If the ith path, denoted by
PSprev[i,:], is minimal (checked in step DMP.7), then it is not further reduced, because
any subset of a minimal path causes system failure. If the ith path is not minimal, then all
subsets are generated that remove one intact node rn from the path (step DMP.8): PSprev
[i,:]\{rn} for all rn 2 PSprev[i,:] and rn 2 {1, nr}. If node rn is an articula-
tion of path PSprev[i,:], the corresponding subgraphs of PSprev[i,:] are generated.
Articulations and subgraphs are determined by an algorithm based on depth-first search
described by Tarjan in [17]. Along with each subgraph, the non-articulations of PSprev
[i,:] that also belong to the respective subgraph are stored. This information is used
later, in step DMP.13, to generate combinations that remove two or more non-articulations
from a path, dependent on the simulation result (step DMP.11). Due to system monotony, any
subset of a path is generated only if it is not a subset of any combination stored in SF that
causes system failure. Thus, if no subset is generated from path PSprev[i,:] in step DMP.8,
then the system fails for every subset of this path; it is minimal and is marked by
isMinPSprev[i]: = true. The generation of subsets of paths ends after every path in
PSprev has been processed, that is, i > npprev (step DMP.10).
Next (step DMP.11), the model is simulated for every generated combination in order to
determine if the system is operating. From the simulation result (sysOp or not sysOp), it is first
determined which paths in PSprev are minimal. If a path is minimal, it is stored in PS and
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marked as minimal in isMinPS. Then, dependent on whether they cause system operation or
failure, the combinations are stored either in PS or in SF, and the respective counter (np or nsf)
is increased (step DMP.12).
For those paths in PS that were established due to an articulation and that are no superset of
any other path, combinations are generated that remove two or more non-articulations from the
original path in PSprev (step DMP.13). This is necessary since articulations can also belong to a
Figure 8. Flow chart of minimal path set detection algorithm DMP.
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minimal path. The system model is then simulated for the generated combinations. Dependent on
the simulation result, a combination is stored either in PS or SF (steps DMP.14 and 15).
Next, array PS is tidied up by deleting those paths that are a superset of any other path (step
DMP.16). A path can be minimal only if it is not a superset of any other path. If every of the np
paths in PS is marked as minimal (step DMP.17), the detection is complete and the process ends.
Otherwise, the process continues with a new iteration at step DMP.5.
3.2.2. A minimal path set detection example
The detection algorithm DMP is illustrated by means of the redundant electric heating circuit
shown in Figure 9. This small, academic example permits a complete illustration of the detection
algorithm, addressing all its core characteristics. For an aircraft system model of the size and
complexity shown in Figure 1, the corresponding graph is quite large and hence the course of the
detection algorithm is far too extensive for illustration.
The electric circuit shown in Figure 9 consists of two heating elements 1, 4 that are resistive
voltage dividers (refer also to Figure 2). Each heating element is connected to a voltage source 2, 6
and to a ground element 3, 5. The circuit works (sysOp) i.e. heat is produced, if current flows
through at least one of the two heating elements. This occurs if all components of at least one of
the two following sets of components are intact: 1; 2; 3f g or 4; 5; 6f g. Obviously, each of these two
sets is a minimal path according to the definition in Section 3.1.1. In addition, the heating
elements 1, 4 are interconnected, and a supplemental ground 7 is connected to voltage source
6. This arrangement allows for another way of operating the circuit: Current can flow from
voltage source 6 (grounded by means of 7) through the heating resistors 4 and 1 to ground 3; thus
1; 3; 4; 6; 7f g is another minimal path of the circuit.
The graph corresponding to this circuit is shown in Figure 10(a). Its minimal path set
(consisting of three minimal paths) PS ¼ 1; 2; 3f g; 4; 5; 6f g; 1; 3; 4; 6; 7f gf g is indicated by the
nodes marked green in Figure 10(b–d).
Figure 10. Graph (a) of electric heating circuit shown in Figure 9 and its three minimal paths (b), (c), (d) .
Figure 9. Redundant electric heating circuit.
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The detection algorithm DMP proceeds as follows. In the tables below, column ’row’ indicates the
progress of the algorithm in terms of ‘nLoop-number of comb’, for example, '0–1ʹ denotes
combination 1 of iteration 0 (nLoop = 0). Entries 'x’ and '–’ in the tables connote 'yes’ and 'no’
(or ’not applicable’), respectively.
The meaning of the symbols used is as follows, as yet not defined:
isArt indicates if rn is an articulation of the respective path
comb generated combination of intact nodes
simC array of generated combinations, input for simulations of the system model
sysOp array of simulation result (system operates or not) for every combination in simC
nonArt non-articulation nodes of a path in PSprev that also belong to a generated subgraph
In the preparation phase it is checked if the system operates when all its components are intact
(step DMP.2 in Figure 8). Thus, the simulation input simC is as indicated in Table 1. At this
initial stage, no path has yet been detected and PSprev is empty.
The system operates, so the set of initially intact nodes is stored as a single, non-minimal path
(np = 1) in PS (step DMP.4). SF is empty (nsf = 0), as Table 2 indicates.
The process continues with iteration one (nLoop = 1). The path data are assigned to PSprev,
isMinPSprev and npprev. PS, isMinPS and np are reset (step DMP.5). Combinations are then
generated from path PSprev[1,:] as follows (step DMP.8): Node 1 is an articulation. The path
splits into two subgraphs 2; 3f g and 4; 5; 6; 7f g due to the removal of node 1. The non-articulations
of the original path PSprev[1,:] that also belong to the respective subgraphs are 2; 3f g and
5; 7f g. Node 2 is not an articulation, thus a combination is generated by removing node 2 from
PSprev[1,:], and likewise for nodes 3, 5 and 7. Altogether, 10 combinations are generated for
simulation of the system model. They are listed in Table 3 and are shown in Figure 11 using the
same row indices 1–1, 1–2, etc.
Table 1. Combinations tested (by simulation of system model) at initial stage of detection process.
comb stored in simC
Row PSprev rn isArt comb No Yes sysOp nonArt
0–1 – – – {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} – x x –
Table 2. Path set after initial stage of detection process.
PS isMinPS SF
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} – –
Table 3. Combinations tested during first iteration of detection process.
comb stored in simC
Row PSprev rn isArt comb No Yes sysOp nonArt
1–1 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} {1} x {2, 3} – x – {2, 3}
1–2 {1} x {4, 5, 6, 7} – x x {5, 7}
1–3 {2} – {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} – x x -
1–4 {3} – {1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7} – x x -
1–5 {4} x {1, 2, 3} – x x {2, 3}
1–6 {4} x {5, 6, 7} – x – {5, 7}
1–7 {5} – {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7} – x x -
1–8 {6} x {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} – x x {2, 3, 5}
1–9 {6} x {7} – x – {7}
1–10 {7} – {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} – x x -
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The simulation result of step DMP.11 is listed in column sysOp of the table and also
visualized in Figure 11: Combinations of intact nodes that cause the system to operate are marked
blue, those causing system failure are marked red. The simulation result indicates that path
PSprev[1,:] is not minimal, because the system operates for subsets of it, namely for those
in rows 1–2, 1–3, 1–4, 1–5, 1–7, 1–8 and 1–10. These combinations are stored as paths in PS,
np = 7. The other combinations in rows 1–1 and 1–6 are stored in SF, nsf = 2 (step DMP.12).
The one in row 1–9, 7f g, is not stored in SF as it is a subset of 5; 6; 7f g.
At this stage, two of the seven paths in PS are not supersets of any other path, namely rows 1–2
and 1–5 in Table 3 (marked bold). Other paths can exist that include some of the articulations of
the original path PSprev[1,:]. To assure that such paths are detected, further combinations that
are no superset of any path in PS – in this case 4; 5; 6; 7f g and 1; 2; 3f g – must be generated (step
DMP.13). Such combinations remove as many non-articulations from the original path as non-
superset paths were deduced from it, namely two (rows 1–2 and 1–5) in the case of PSprev
[1,:]. To avoid generating supersets, one node of every set of non-articulations, 5; 7f g and
2; 3f g, is removed from the original path, respectively. Thus, the combinations PSprev[1,:]
n 2; 5f g, PSprev[1,:] n 2; 7f g, PSprev[1,:] n 3; 5f g and PSprev[1,:] n 3; 7f g are generated.
These are listed in rows 1–11 through 1–14 of Table 4 and are shown in Figure 12. The paths
denoted by rows 1–2 and 1–5 of Table 3 are shown again in the lower left part of the figure; due to
this, it can be seen that neither generated combination, 1–11 through 1–14, is a superset of any of
these paths.
Figure 11. Combinations tested during first iteration of detection process.
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As before, the result of the simulation (step DMP.14) is indicated in column sysOp of Table 4
and shown in Figure 12. Consequently, three more paths are stored in PS, np ¼ 7þ 3 ¼ 10,
and one more combination in SF, nsf ¼ 2þ 1 ¼ 3 (step DMP.15). The total number of
simulations so far is nsim ¼ 1þ 10þ 4 ¼ 15. Supersets of paths are removed from PS, which
leads to np ¼ 5 paths remaining after completion of step DMP.16. Table 5 and Figure 13
summarize the content of arrays PS and SF at this stage – end of the first iteration – of the
detection process.
Since none of the paths in PS is marked as minimal (step DMP.17), the process continues with
a second iteration (nLoop = 2). The path data are assigned to PSprev, isMinPSprev and
npprev. PS, isMinPS and np are reset (step DMP.5). Then, combinations are generated (step
DMP.8) from each of the npprev = 5 paths in PSprev as listed in Table 6. Three combinations are
generated from PSprev[1,:] ¼ 1; 2; 3f g, but only one is stored in simC for simulation. The
other two are not stored in simC because they are a subset of a combination in SF, as indicated
in rows 2–1 and 2–3. If a combination causes system failure, every subset of it causes system
failure as well due to system monotony.
Any combination is stored only once in simC, as indicated in row 2–12, for instance. Eight
combinations are stored altogether for simulation in step DMP.11.
The simulation result (column sysOp) indicates that PSprev[1,:] ¼ 1; 2; 3f g and PSprev
[4,:] ¼ 1; 3; 4; 6; 7f g are minimal, because the system fails for every respective subset. These
paths are stored in PS and marked as minimal in isMinPS (step DMP.12). In addition, two non-
Table 4. Combinations tested during first iteration that remove two non-articulations from PSprev[1,:].
comb stored in simC
Row PSprev rn comb No Yes sysOp
1–11 {2, 5} {1, 3, 4, 6, 7} – x x
1–12 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} {2, 7} {1, 3, 4, 5, 6} – x x
1–13 {3, 5} {1, 2, 4, 6, 7} – x –
1–14 {3, 7} {1, 2, 4, 5, 6} – x x
Figure 12. Combinations tested during first iteration that remove two non-articulations from PSprev[1,:].
Table 5. Path set PS and combinations that cause system failure SF, as existent after first
iteration of detection process.
PS isMinPS SF
{1, 2, 3} – {1, 2, 4, 6, 7}
{1, 2, 4, 5, 6} – {2, 3}
{1, 3, 4, 5, 6} – {5, 6, 7}
{1, 3, 4, 6, 7} –
{4, 5, 6, 7} –
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minimal paths, 4; 5; 6f g in row 2–5 and 1; 4; 5; 6f g in row 2–6, are stored in PS; the latter will be
removed in step DMP.16.
Figure 13. Path set PS and combinations that cause system failure SF, as existent after first iteration of detection process.
Table 6. Combinations tested during second iteration of detection process.
comb stored in simC
Row PSprev rn isArt comb No Yes sysOp nonArt
2–1 {1} – {2, 3}  2; 3f g – – –
2–2 {1, 2, 3} {2} – {1, 3} – x – –
2–3 {3} – {1, 2}  1; 2; 4; 6; 7f g – – –
2–4 {1} x {2}  1; 2; 4; 6; 7f g – – –
2–5 {1} x {4, 5, 6} – x x {5,6}
2–6 {2} – {1, 4, 5, 6} – x x –
2–7 {1, 2, 4, 5, 6} {4} x {1, 2}  1; 2; 4; 6; 7f g – – –
2–8 {4} x {5, 6}  5; 6; 7f g – – –
2–9 {5} – {1, 2, 4, 6}  1; 2; 4; 6; 7f g – – –
2–10 {6} – {1, 2, 4, 5} – x – –
2–11 {1} x {3}  2; 3f g – – –
2–12 {1} x {4, 5, 6} Exists in simC – x –
2–13 {3} – {1, 4, 5, 6} Exists in simC – x –
2–14 {1, 3, 4, 5, 6} {4} x {1, 3} exists in simC – – –
2–15 {4} x {5, 6}  5; 6; 7f g – – –
2–16 {5} – {1, 3, 4, 6} – x – –
2–17 {6} – {1, 3, 4, 5} – x – –
2–18 {1} x {3}  2; 3f g – – –
2–19 {1} x {4, 6, 7}  1; 2; 4; 6; 7f g – – –
2–20 {3} – {1, 4, 6, 7}  1; 2; 4; 6; 7f g – – –
2–21 {1, 3, 4, 6, 7} {4} x {1, 3} Exists in simC – – –
2–22 {4} x {6, 7}  5; 6; 7f g – – –
2–23 {6} x {1, 3, 4} – x – {3}
2–24 {6} x {7}  5; 6; 7f g – – –
2–25 {7} – {1, 3, 4, 6} Exists in simC – – –
2–26 {4} – {5, 6, 7}  5; 6; 7f g – – –
2–27 {5} – {4, 6, 7}  1; 2; 4; 6; 7f g – – –
2–28 {4, 5, 6, 7} {6} x {4, 5} – x – {4,5}
2–29 {6} x {7}  5; 6; 7f g – – –
2–30 {7} – {4, 5, 6} Exists in simC – x –
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It is not necessary in this iteration to generate combinations that remove two or more non-
articulations from any path in PSprev. The reason is: At most one subgraph that causes system
operation is deduced from any path in PSprev. In the case of PSprev[2,:] ¼ 1; 2; 4; 5; 6f g,
subgraphs 2f g, 4; 5; 6f g and 1; 2f g, 5; 6f g are generated due to articulations 1 and 4, respec-
tively. The system operates only for 4; 5; 6f g. In order to generate every combination from
PSprev[2,:] that is no superset of 4; 5; 6f g, it is sufficient to remove one non-articulation
from PSprev[2,:]. These combinations are generated already in step DMP.8, as Table 6
shows (rows 2–9 and 2–10).
Thus, np = 4 paths are stored in PS of which two are marked as minimal. nsf ¼ 3þ 3 ¼ 6
combinations are stored in SF. The total number of simulations so far is nsim ¼ 15þ 8 ¼ 23.
np = 3 paths remain in PS after removal of supersets in step DMP.16. The content of arrays PS
and SF at this stage – end of the second iteration – of the process is summarized in Table 7 and
Figure 14.
Table 7. Path set PS and combinations that cause system failure SF, as existent after second
iteration of detection process.
PS isMinPS SF
{1, 2, 3} x {1, 2, 4, 5}
{1, 3, 4, 6, 7} x {1, 2, 4, 6, 7}
{4, 5, 6} – {1, 3, 4, 5}
{1, 3, 4, 6}
{2, 3}
{5, 6, 7}
Table 8. Third iteration of detection process (no combinations tested).
comb stored in simC
Row PSprev rn isArt comb No Yes sysOp nonArt
3–1 {4} – {5, 6}  5; 6; 7f g – – –
3–2 {4, 5, 6} {5} – {4, 6}  1; 3; 4; 6f g – – –
3–3 {6} – {4, 5}  1; 2; 4; 5f g – – –
Figure 14. Path set PS and combinations that cause system failure SF, as existent after second iteration of detection process.
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Since not all paths are marked as minimal, the process enters a third iteration, nLoop = 3.
Again, the path data are assigned to PSprev, isMinPSprev and npprev. PS, isMinPS and
np are reset. Then, combinations are generated only for the non-minimal path PSprev[3,:]
¼ 4; 5; 6f g in step DMP.8. As Table 8 shows, every generated combination is a subset of any
combination in SF. This means that PSprev[3,:] is also minimal, and no further simulations
are necessary. Thus, the process is complete. The minimal path set of the example system
(Figure 10) is correctly detected, as Table 9 indicates.
Next, the probability of system operation (or failure) is computed. For illustration, Equation (3) is
evaluated for the detected minimal path set. With the component reliabilities Ri ¼ RiðtÞ, the
probabilities of the minimal paths are
P PS1ð Þ ¼ R1R2R3; P PS2ð Þ ¼ R1R3R4R6R7; P PS3ð Þ ¼ R4R5R6:
For the second-order intersections, the probabilities are
P PS1 ^ PS2ð Þ ¼ R1R2R3R4R6R7; P PS1 ^ PS3ð Þ ¼ R1R2R3R4R5R6;
P PS2 ^ PS3ð Þ ¼ R1R3R4R5R6R7:
The probability of the single third-order intersection is
P PS1 ^ PS2 ^ PS3ð Þ ¼ R1R2R3R4R5R6R7:
Employing these products, Equation (3) reads
RsysðtÞ ¼ R1R2R3 þ R1R3R4R6R7 þ R4R5R6
 R1R2R3R4R6R7 þ R1R2R3R4R5R6 þ R1R3R4R5R6R7ð Þ
þR1R2R3R4R5R6R7:
If it is assumed that λi ¼ 102=h and t ¼ 1h, thus R ¼ Ri ¼ 0:990, then the probability of
system operation is Rsysð1hÞ ¼ 2R3 þ R5  3R6 þ R7 ¼ 0:99922 or likewise, the probability of
system failure is Fsysð1hÞ ¼ 1 Rsysð1hÞ ¼ 7:8  104.
3.2.3. Proof and boundary effort of detection method
The minimal path set detection method DMP gives a complete result when applied to any multi-
domain object-oriented system model that fulfils the conditions (1), (2) and (3) stated in Section
3.1.2. In addition, the method is finite which means that it terminates when applied to any such
model. The completeness and finiteness are proven in the following. The upper and lower bounds
of the required computing effort are also derived.
Completeness. Consider a detection method that merely exploits the monotony of the analysed
system. It starts with a set of all nodes as the initial path. Every combination is generated that
removes a single node from the path. It is tested for each (by simulation of the model) if the
system operates. Those combinations that cause system operation constitute a set of paths. In the
set of paths, only those are kept that are no superset of any other, because only a non-superset
path can be minimal. Thus, a complete path set of the system exists at the end of an iteration of
the detection method.
A next iteration is entered. All combinations are generated that remove a single node from
every path in the set of the previous iteration. In so doing, subsets of combinations that cause
system failure are omitted. Due to monotony, if a combination causes system failure, the
Table 9. Minimal path set detected after third iteration of the process.
PS isMinPS
{1, 2, 3} x
{1, 3, 4, 6, 7} x
{4, 5, 6} x
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system remains failed if any node is removed from that combination. Again, testing the
generated combinations leads to a complete set of paths, a next iteration is entered with all
non-superset paths of the set, and so on. At some point it is found that the system fails on
removal of any node from a path. Such a path is minimal by definition. The method continues
reducing the other paths until all in the set of paths are minimal. Since every path was reduced
by a single node from one iteration to the next, it is obvious that the method gives the
complete minimal path set.
In addition to exploiting system monotony, method DMP benefits from the fact that only a
coherent set of intact nodes can be a minimal path. Evaluation of the system graph hence reduces
the number of simulations required for minimal path set detection.
A path is split into subgraphs at the articulations of the path. In this way, subgraphs are
generated for every path that exists in the path set of the previous iteration of DMP. If two or
more subgraphs of a path cause system operation, all combinations are generated that remove as
many non-articulations from that path, as subgraphs were deduced from it that cause system
operation. (Two or more nodes are removed, because all combinations that reduce a path by one
of its non-articulations have been generated and tested in a preceding step.) In so doing, for the
generated combinations to be no superset of any of the subgraphs of that path, each non-
articulation removed from the path belongs to exactly one of its subgraphs. Thus, if any such
combination causes system operation, it exists in the path set at the end of an iteration of DMP. It
follows that the path set at the end of any iteration is complete, and hence method DMP is
complete.
Finiteness. DMP commences with a set of all nodes of a monotonous system as the initial path.
It tests if the system still operates for subsets of a (the initial or other) path. Every subset removes
one or more nodes from a path. Nodes are never added to a path from one iteration to the next.
DMP repeats gradually removing nodes until the system fails for all subsets of a path, that is, if
that path is minimal. For those paths not yet identified as minimal, subsets of them are generated
until they be reduced no further without causing system failure, that is, until every path is
minimal. Then, the process ends. If every single node of a system constitutes a minimal path,
the process ends after all nodes are failed. Due to monotony, a system fails if all its nodes fail.
Thus, method DMP clearly terminates.
Effort. For illustration of the highest computing effort, consider a complete system graph that
includes no articulations. Removal of any node gives a subsequent smaller complete graph. In
addition, consider that every single node of the nr nodes of the system graph constitutes a
minimal path. Then, the number of simulations in each iteration nLoop of DMP is the binomial
Cðnr; nLoopÞ. DMP iterates until all nodes are failed, that is, nLoop ¼ nr. The total number of
simulations is thus
Pnr
nLoop¼0 Cðnr; nLoopÞ ¼ 2nr , the same as a ‘brute force’ approach needs.
The lowest effort occurs if a system operates only with all its nodes intact (single minimal
path that comprises all nodes of the system). Irrespective of the density of the system graph,
DMP runs until iteration nLoop ¼ 1 is completed. The total number of simulations is
hence
P1
nLoop¼0 Cðnr; nLoopÞ ¼ 1þ nr.
The number of simulations required by DMP is thus bound by the upper limit 2nr and lower
limit 1þ nr. Between these bounds, the actual effort depends on the density of the system graph,
Table 10. Comparison of effort of minimal path set detection for three cases.
nsim
Case System graph E d PS Monotony only DMP
1 Figure 10(a) 8 0.381 {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6, 7} 35 15
Figure 10(a) 8 0.381 {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, {1, 3, 4, 6, 7} 40 23
Figure 15 10 0.476 {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, {1, 3, 4, 6, 7} 40 34
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the number of minimal paths and number of nodes thereof. The more effort is saved, the lower
the density of a system graph is.
For illustration, Table 10 lists the number of simulations nsim for three detection cases. The
number of edges and density (Equation (1)) of the respective graphs are denoted by E and d. The
number of nodes is N ¼ nr ¼ 7 for all cases. nsim is stated for method DMP, as well as a method
that exploits the system ‘monotony only’ (no evaluation of the graph), as described. Case 2
corresponds to the example in Section 3.2.2. Case 1 relates to the same graph, but the system
has one less minimal path. Case 3 assumes the same minimal path set as case 2, but the graph has
a higher density (see Figure 15). The comparison shows that the fewer minimal paths exist and the
lower the density of the graph, the smaller effort required by DMP. With an increasing number of
minimal paths and graph density, the effort of DMP approaches that of the ‘monotony only’
method. A ‘brute force’ method neither evaluates the monotony of a system nor its graph; it thus
requires 2nr ¼ 128 simulations for each case.
4. Conclusions
This article contributes a method called DMP for detection of the minimal path set of any fault-
tolerant system that is represented as a multi-domain object-oriented model. It includes a
description, exemplification and substantiation of the method.
DMP belongs to the class of state space simulations. Evaluation of the system graph reduces the
number of simulations required, thus ensuring feasibility of DMP. It has been successfully tested
on large, realistic models of safety relevant aircraft systems, such as the rudder control and
actuation shown in Figure 1. For this matter, more detail can be obtained from section 6 of [3].
DMP can be employed throughout the system development process to keep the safety analysis
up-to-date with design iterations. This is meaningful particularly if multi-domain object-oriented
modelling is used already in systems engineering. DMP enhances the scope of application of a
model while permitting all other simulation studies that originally motivated implementation of
the model to be conducted. Thus, DMP supports the concept of model-based systems engineering
(MBSE).
It must be borne in mind that all model-based safety analysis methods capture only those
phenomena that are covered in the modelling. A model is always an abstraction of a real system
and might hence be incomplete. Then again, using DMP ensures that all relevant failure condi-
tions, at least in so far as modelled, are captured.
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